

<sup>16</sup> Levinas, E., *TI*, p. 229.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Duval, R., "Exode et altérité," in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 59 (1975), n. 2, pp. 235–236.

<sup>18</sup> Vide Levinas, E., *AE*, pp. 89, 160, 180, etc.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Levinas, E., *TI*, p. 146: "L'Autre ne s'oppose à moi comme une autre liberté, mais semblable à la mienne et, par conséquent, hostile à la mienne (...) Son altérité se manifeste dans une maîtrise qui ne conquiert pas, mais enseigne", and p. 178: "L'Autre n'est pas pour la raison un scandale qui la met en mouvement dialectique, mais le premier enseignement raisonnable, la condition de tout enseignement."

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Buber, M., *Ich und Du*, in *Das dialogische Prinzip*, Lambert Schneider Verlag, Heidelberg, 1984, p. 37.

<sup>21</sup> Levinas, E., *AE*, p. 151.

<sup>22</sup> Levinas, E., *TI*, p. 253.

<sup>23</sup> Vide Levinas, E., *AE*, p. 177.

<sup>24</sup> Vide Jankélévitch, V., *La paradoxe de la moralité* (The Paradox of Morality) (Trans. N. Pérez de Lara), Tusquets Editores (Col. Marginales, 77), Barcelona, 1983 (Paris, 1981), p. 53 (Translation by the author).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 214–221.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 222.

<sup>27</sup> Jankélévitch, V., *op. cit.*, p. 231.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>29</sup> As S. Strasser states, the first chapters of *TI* leave no trace of suspicion of a "philosophie de l'ambiguïté," in *Jenseits von Sein und Zeit. Eine Einführung in E. Levinas' Philosophie*, Martinus Nijhoff (Coll. Phänomenologica, 78), The Hague, 1978, p. 152.

<sup>30</sup> Levinas, E., "Textes messianiques," en *DL*, p. 120. Cf. *AE*, p. 145: "Le mot Je signifie me voici, répondant de tout et de tous."

<sup>31</sup> Vide Heidegger, M., *Von Wesen des Grundes*, in *Wegmarken* (Gesamtausgabe, 9), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. Main, 1967, p. 175.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Nietzsche, F., *Also sprach Zarathustra* (Werke in drei Bänden, zweiter Band. — K. Schlechta), Carl Hanser Verlag, Munich, 1973, p. 282 (Zarathustras Vorrede, 4): "Ich liebe den, dessen Seele sich verschwendet, der nicht Dank haben will und nicht zurückgibt: denn er schenkt immer und will sich nicht bewahren."

<sup>33</sup> Quoted from the French version: Levinas, E., "Martin Buber et la théorie de la connaissance," in *Nomus proprius*, Fata Morgana, Montpellier, 1976, p. 46. Cf. Buber, M., *op. cit.*, p. 19: "Beziehung ist Gegenseitigkeit."

<sup>34</sup> Levinas, E., *TI*, p. 244.

<sup>35</sup> Levinas, E., *TI*, p. 232.

<sup>36</sup> Vide Levinas, E., "Martin Buber et..." *art. cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>38</sup> Levinas, E., *TI*, p. 267.

<sup>39</sup> Vide Levinas, E., "Une religion d'adultes," in *DL*, p. 33.

<sup>40</sup> Vide Levinas, E., "Vérité du dévoilement et vérité du témoignage," in *Archivio di Filosofia* (Lu Testimonianza), Cedam, Padua, 1972, p. 109.

<sup>41</sup> Levinas, E., *TI*, pp. 50–51.

<sup>42</sup> Vide Buber, M., *Elemente des Zwischenmenschlichen*, in *Das dialogische Prinzip*, p. 280.

<sup>43</sup> Levinas, E., *AE*, p. 177.

## PHENOMENOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS

When one regards the life-world as the normative fundament, one has to face a problem: how can it be shown that such a position is compatible with the thesis that morality is autonomous? From the communicative ethics developed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, one can find a possible way of demonstrating this compatibility. However, the basic difference between Apel's and Habermas' conception of communicative ethics has complicated the solution. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to clarify the difference between them, before showing how communicative ethics can at the same time maintain the autonomy of morality and the function of the life-world as the normative fundament.

For phenomenologists, the significance of communicative ethics lies naturally first of all in its discussion of the role played by the life-world — an important leading concept in phenomenology. But beyond this general concern, we shall try here to demonstrate that the difference between Apel and Habermas in communicative ethics reflects the difference between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in the phenomenological movement. Namely, in order to make clear the nature of the difference between Apel and Habermas, it is helpful to compare it with the difference between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Moreover, although it is not quite well-known, Husserl has developed a systematic criticism of Kant's formalistic ethics in his unpublished lectures of the Freiburg period. Regarding the formalistic character of the communicative ethics claimed by Apel and Habermas, it is also of interest to see whether Husserl's critique of Kantian formalistic ethics is also applicable to their communicative ethics.

Finally, by appreciating the critical function of communicative ethics, we shall try to show in what way communicative ethics can mediate the thesis of the life-world as the normative fundament and the thesis of the autonomy of morality.

phy (*erste Philosophie*). While Husserl identifies the first philosophy with a new kind of philosophy of consciousness, i.e., a transcendental phenomenology, Apel equates it with a new kind of philosophy of language, i.e., a transcendental pragmatics. In regard to the respective development of their thinking, one can also discern the following basic correspondences between these two philosophers.

First, in Apel's writings there is implied a kind of reduction which functions like Husserl's phenomenological reduction. Such a reduction leads us from a conventional domestic morality (*konventionelle Bienenmoral*) to a postconventional universalistic morality (*postkonventionelle universalistische Moral*).<sup>1</sup> One can analogically call this "communicative-ethical reduction."

Second, the principle of universalization (*Universalisierungsprinzip*) (U) has a status within communicative ethics paralleling the status of the principle of all principles in Husserl's phenomenology. The formulation of the principle of universalization in communicative ethics is as follows:

(U): Each valid norm must fulfill the condition that the consequences and side effects, which presumably result from its *general* being followed for the satisfaction of the interests of *each* individual, can be accepted by *all* people concerned without any compulsion.<sup>2</sup>

Although this principle is introduced by Habermas, Apel totally accepts it and regards it as "an adequate explication of the normative principle."<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the principle of universalization in communicative ethics, like the principle of all principles in Husserl's phenomenology, is conceived as a *Rechtfertigungsprinzip* or *Begründungsprinzip*.

Third, in claiming that (U) is merely a *Verfahrensprinzip*, Apel, at this point, and Habermas too, exercises a kind of eidetic reduction. But, unlike "eidetic reduction" in the Husserlian sense, "eidetic reduction" in the Apelian (and Habermasian) sense only admits a formal a priori but not a material a priori. In general, the communicative a priori, or, in particular, the normative-ethical conditions of the possibility of communication are purely *formal* in character. For example, (U) is

*kein Generationsprinzip inhaltlicher Normen, sondern nur ein Verfahrensprinzip für die – realen oder internalisierten – praktischen Diskurse, in denen inhaltliche Normen begründet werden sollen –*

as is pointed out by Apel.<sup>4</sup> Fourth, both Husserl and Apel maintain the possibility as well as the necessity of the "ultimate grounding of

philosophy in general" (*Letztbegründung der Philosophie überhaupt*). While Husserl appeals to "ultimate grounding in cogito" (*die Letztbegründung im cogito*),<sup>5</sup> Apel bases it "in die Nichthintergebarkeit des argumentativen Diskurses."<sup>6</sup> According to these two philosophers, overcoming skepticism is the major task of philosophy. They believe that the final triumph of philosophy over any skeptical challenges and hence the very possibility of philosophy itself can only be guaranteed by the "ultimate foundation" of philosophy. In this respect, they are followers of Descartes. But while Husserl starts with the notion of "apodictic evidence," Apel begins with the concept of "pragmatic contradiction."

Fifth, for Husserl as well as for Apel, philosophy is essentially *transcendental*. Habermas points out that

*Mit der 'Argumentation überhaupt' gewinnt Apel einen Bezugspunkt, der für die Analyse nicht-verwerfbarer Regeln genauso fundamental ist wie das 'Ich denke' bzw. das 'Bewusstsein überhaupt' für die Reflexionsphilosophie.<sup>7</sup>*

That is to say, "argumentation in general" has a place in Apel's transcendental pragmatics that corresponds exactly to the position occupied by "consciousness in general" in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. In insisting on developing philosophy in a transcendental manner, both Husserl and Apel belong to the Kantian tradition.

Finally, the concept of "responsibility" plays an important role in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology as well as in Apelian transcendental pragmatics. With this concept both Husserl and Apel respectively introduce a *teleological* dimension in phenomenology and communicative ethics. In realizing the regulative character of "apodictic evidence," the later Husserl has to conceive the intentional constitution of objects as a teleological movement. Only with the conception of intentionality as responsibility can Husserl see the possibility of the realization of a *complete* account of the constitution of objects in the world. According to Husserl, the search for apodictic evidence can be made possible only when the phenomenologist himself fulfills the ethical condition: "To be a *responsible* philosopher!" On the other hand, Apel maintains analogically,

*(U) selbst müsste nämlich . . . nicht nur auf der Ebene des handlungsrelevanten Diskurses für die von den Folgen ihrer Anwendung Betroffenen akzeptiert sein, sondern sie müsste auch auf der Ebene der geschichtsbezogenen Anwendung für die Einzelnen als hinreichendes Prinzip der Maximembefolgung, etwa im Sinne der Pflicht zur Beteiligung*

an schon institutionalisierten oder noch erst zu organisierenden praktischen Diskursen, akzeptierbar sein.<sup>8</sup>

As a consequence, in addition to (U), Apel introduces in an auxiliary manner "ein moralisch-strategisches Ergänzungsprinzip (E).<sup>9</sup> In fact, Apel formulates (E) in the following way:

Das im handlungsentlasteten Diskurs gültige Prinzip sollte auch bei der Lösung von Interessenkonflikten in der Lebenswelt, in der Kommunikation nicht handlungsentlastet, sind angewandt werden.<sup>10</sup>

Apel also emphasizes:

Das von mir angedeutete Ergänzungsprinzip (E) ist zwar teleologisch orientiert, aber nicht am substantiellen *Telos* des guten Lebens, sondern am *Telos* der Beseitigung der Hindernisse, die der Anwendung des reinen Diskursprinzips (U) im Wege stehen.<sup>11</sup>

The above thematization of the similarities between Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Apel's version of communicative ethics reminds us of Habermas' complaint that Apel "den Letztbegründungsanspruch der Transzendentalpragmatik genau auf jene Identifikation von Aussagenwahrheit und Gewissheitserlebnis, die nur im Reflexion Nachvollzug einer vorgängig intuitiv vollzogenen Leistung, d.h. nur unter Bedingungen der Bewusstseinsphilosophie vorgenommen werden kann."<sup>12</sup> However, in order to fully work out the difference between Habermas and Apel, it is helpful to start with an exposition of Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl. Such a move is understandable if we realize that there is a strong anti-Cartesian tendency in Merleau-Ponty's and Habermas' philosophies.

In brief, one can summarize Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl in the following theses:

(1) The Cartesian ultimate grounding is impossible. Like other French phenomenologists, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the pre-giveness of the life-world. Phenomenology for him is nothing but the explication of the "logos of the aesthetic world."

(2) Phenomenological reduction is essentially *incomplete*. Accordingly, phenomenological reduction does not lead us to any "worldless" subjectivity.

(3) Eidetic reduction is necessary only because we need the realm of the ideal to know and conquer the factuality of the world. Fixation through eidetic variation is merely a means and is basically transitional. The goal is rather the living stream of reality. In other words, "he views the entire order of essences merely as a provisional conceptual fixation, imposed on us by the character of language."<sup>13</sup>

Paralleling Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl, Habermas develops a similar objection against Apel. First of all, Habermas rejects Apel's thesis of "ultimate grounding." According to Habermas, Apel's claim of "ultimate grounding" results from "einer inkonsequenten Rückkehr zu Denkfiguren, die er mit den energisch vollzogen Paradigmenwechsel von der Bewusstseins-zur Sprachphilosophie selber entwertet hat."<sup>14</sup> Habermas himself regards communicative ethics as a kind of reconstructive science. Namely, the presuppositions and rules of argumentation result rather from a rational reconstruction. As a reconstructive science, communicative ethics has to be supplemented by the empirical sciences. In general, a reconstructive science has to be subject to the empirical test. Such a thesis of complementarity between philosophical theory and the empirical sciences reminds us of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological positivism. Indeed, in granting a transitional character to eidetic reduction, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the cooperation between essential variation and induction.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, Merleau-Ponty is well-conscious of the fundamental *dynamic* character of reality. Accordingly, "he views the entire order of essences merely as a provisional conceptual fixation."<sup>16</sup> Similarly, in granting the status of reconstructive science to communicative ethics, Habermas tries to avoid the absolutization of moral theory. One can ascertain that for Habermas the meta-community has to be "sensitive to everything" or "sensitive to the variety of the situation." As a matter of fact, Habermas claims that there no damage results if the "ultimate grounding" thesis is abolished.<sup>17</sup> Such an antifundamentalistic position can also give us the new possibility of testing the validity of communicative ethics. Namely, it can well be incorporated into the dimension of the development of moral and legal consciousness and hence be subject to indirect testing.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to Lawrence Kohlberg's six-stage classification of the development of moral consciousness, Habermas introduces a seventh stage. This is a stage of communicative ethics. At this highest stage, "the principle of justification of norms is no longer the monologically applicable principle of universalizability but the communally followed *procedure* of redeeming normative validity claims discursively."<sup>19</sup> With this new principle for the justification of norms, Habermas is able to find a possible solution for the problem of legitimation at the rational level. That is to say, the rational reconstructions of the conditions of the validity of expressions provide a *critical* standard to set beside law-giving authority.<sup>20</sup> Here one can see that Habermas' theory also

implies a kind of communicative-ethical reduction which leads us from the conventional level of morality to the highest stage of the post-conventional level of morality.<sup>21</sup> However, Habermas' version of the communicative-ethical reduction is by no means transcendental. The difference between Habermas' and Apel's versions of the communicative-ethical reduction is quite similar to that between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological reduction and Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Moreover, it seems that for Habermas the necessity of the communicative-ethical reduction lies in the *critical* function of communicative ethics. Indeed, Habermas not only embeds this reduction in the process of social evolution, and hence admits the *historical* character of the communicative-ethical reduction, but also emphasizes that even communicative ethics themselves are rooted "in the horizon of the life-world".<sup>22</sup> Indeed, he explicitly points out:

Wenn nicht schon hier, in Zusammenhängen kommunikativen Handelns, also vor aller Reflexion, Geltungsansprüche im Plural auftreten, ist eine Differenzierung zwischen Wahrheit und normativer Richtigkeit auf der Ebene der Argumentation nicht zu erwarten.<sup>23</sup>

On the other hand, in spite of recognizing that "Universalistische Moralen sind auf Lebensformen angewiesen", Habermas claims that at the post-conventional level of moral consciousness

löst sich das moralische Urteil von den lokalen Übereinkünften und der historischen Färbung einer partikularen Lebensform; es kann sich nicht länger auf die Geltung dieses lebensweltlichen Kontextes berufen.<sup>24</sup>

As a consequence, in distinguishing his thought from that of Merleau-Ponty, Habermas fails to realize that the communicative-ethical reduction is essentially *incomplete*.

Indeed, from a phenomenological standpoint, one can make the following remarks in regard to Habermas' exceptions to Apelian communicative ethics:

First of all, Habermas, like Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl which rests on the conception of pre-reflective consciousness, bases his critique of Apel on the notion of pre-reflective communication. According to Habermas, we have to understand "the communication community in the first place as a community of interaction and not of argumentation, as action and not as discourse."<sup>25</sup> In particular, we have to recognize that "Der Streit um Norm bleibt, auch wenn er mit diskursiven Mitteln geführt wird, im 'Kampf um Anerkennung' verwurzelt."<sup>26</sup>

Insofar as practical discourse is already operative in our life-world praxis, there is no need to introduce any principle of application of communicative ethics — as is claimed by Apel. Only by overlooking this dimension of pre-reflective communication (and hence falsely identifying communication with reflective argumentation), is one rendered unable to see the *analytical* relation between communicative ethics and the ethics of responsibility. As a consequence, by disclosing the dimension of pre-reflective communication, one can derive the conclusion that "ultimate grounding" in the Apelian sense is not only *unnecessary* but *impossible*. Such an effect is similar to that which results when Merleau-Ponty in his argument against Husserl's thesis of "ultimate grounding" works out the dimension of pre-reflective consciousness. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty tells us "daß Reflexion radikal nur ist als Bewusstsein der Abhängigkeit ihres selbst von dem unreflektierten Leben, in dem sie erstlich, ständig und letztlich sich situiert."<sup>27</sup>

Secondly, according to Ernst Tugendhat, there are actually two different motives underlying Husserl's phenomenology. Namely, the "motive of a critique of knowledge" and the "dogmatic motive." It is only the latter motive which leads Husserl to the Cartesian position of "ultimate grounding."<sup>28</sup> Such a teaching should help the proponents of communicative ethics dispose their minds *for* the critical function of the communicative ethics but at the same time *against* the thesis of "Letztbegründung."

Finally, however, by limiting himself to "the point of view of idealizations of pure communicative action," Habermas fails to realize the *material* presuppositions underlying his communicative ethics.<sup>29</sup>

## II

It is well-known that Hegel criticized Kant's ethical formalism. In a recent essay, Habermas tries to show that Hegel's critique of Kantian formalism does not apply to communicative ethics.<sup>30</sup> However, Husserl's critique of Kant's ethical formalism remains unknown to the public. It is indeed interesting to look and see if communicative ethics can escape from Husserl's critique of formalism.

In the unpublished part of his dissertation, Iso Kern points out:

Husserls Kritik an der kantischen Ethik bezieht sich — abgesehen von den üblichen methodischen Verwürfen — hauptsächlich auf die Verkenning einer apriorischen

fühlenden Vernunft und den daraus resultierenden ethischen Formalismus. Andererseits bewertete er den Kantischen Gedanken einer *formalen* Ethik (auf die sich nach Husserl aber notwendig eine *materiale* aufbauen muss) und spezieller eines formalen Imperatives sowie die Kantische Idee der Pflicht sehr hoch.<sup>31</sup>

According to Husserl, the status of Kant's formal ethics is quite similar to formal logic. So, just as we cannot formally decide what is true merely through the law of contradiction, we cannot formally decide what is morally good merely through the categorical imperative. Furthermore, Husserl complains that the categorical imperative itself is too loose. He writes:

Offenbar läßt sich mit diesem Satz alles machen. Da man in jedem Fall die Maxime in verschiedenster Weise fassen, bald dies, bald jenes, bald allgemeinere, bald weniger allgemeine Umstände in sie aufnehmen kann, so ergeben sich verschiedene und entgegengesetzte Möglichkeiten der Verallgemeinerung.<sup>32</sup>

For Husserl, the origin of Kant's "*abstruser formalism*" lies in Kant's

Sensualisierung des Gefühls, bzw. das Verkennen der fühlenden (oder wertenden) Vernunft.<sup>33</sup>

So, if one can free the moral feeling from the sensualistic prejudice and rightly recognize the "feeling" character of reason, then one can realize that the valuating, active feeling alone can differentiate between rightness and unrightness. Accordingly, Husserl's claims that the obligating (*Verpflichtende*) is determined

aber nicht bloß durch einen formalen Imperativ, sondern wesentlich auch durch materiale Normen.<sup>34</sup>

In other words, according to Husserl, Kant's formal ethics has to be supplemented by *material ethics*.

Is Husserl's critique of Kantian formalistic ethics also applicable to communicative-ethical formalism? This interesting question can be answered in the following manner.

First of all, from the Husserlian standpoint, communicative ethics, despite its distinction from Kantian formalistic ethics, would be too "intellectualistic" for failing to develop a theory of moral feeling. It is true that the proponents of communicative ethics are content to conceive of the fundamental principle of communicative ethics, i.e., (U), not as a "*Generationsprinzip* inhaltlicher Normen, sondern nur ein *Verfahrensprinzip* für die — realen oder internalisierten — *praktischen Diskurse*, in denen inhaltliche Normen begründet werden sollen."<sup>35</sup> But one might ask: "Has the communicative ethical reason not also a

"*fühlende*" character?" As a matter of fact, communicative ethicists need arguments to support their position which excludes the "*fühlende*" aspect of action from the dimension of moral justification. In other words, the proponent of communicative ethics has to explain why moral feeling in the Husserlian sense can contribute nothing to the justification of moral norms. Indeed, if Habermas now also admits "that the 'evidential dimension' of the concept of truth is badly in need of further clarification" then, similarly, the dimension of moral feeling in the Husserlian sense should also be clarified in respect to a full explication of the concept of rightness.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, in interpreting (U) as a *Begründungsprinzip*, the proponents of communicative ethics cannot change its "loose" character as it is found by Husserl in Kant's categorical imperative. For example, we can easily find an intelligent but morally imperfect person who is skillful at setting convincing and wholly acceptable arguments before the public to justify his actions. Accordingly, (U) is not at all a sufficient condition for the justification of moral norms. Husserl would also urge us to go beyond the realm of formal principle in the communicative-ethical version and step into the dimension of material norms. Indeed, as Charles Taylor points out, there is a determinate idea of mankind underlying Habermas' (and Apel's) communicative ethics and such an idea itself is a product of modern times.<sup>37</sup> Namely, in conformity with Habermas' own theory of social evolution or with Apel's theory of the logic of the development of moral consciousness, the rise of a post-conventional communicative ethics itself presupposes the outbreak of a new understanding of the essence of humanity since the Enlightenment. Hence even the very possibility of communicative ethics itself has to be grounded on certain concrete, material life-world norms.

### III

It is true that both Apel and Habermas insist that (U) is a kind of grounding principle. However, if one discovers that each practical discourse has to start with or to presuppose an implicit agreement about norms (*Norm-Einverständnis*), then one cannot deny that the life-world is as the normative fundament "*nicht hintergebar*." Indeed, the limitation of (U) mentioned above shows clearly that it is better understood as a principle for criticism than as a principle of justification. Accordingly, its proper function lies primarily in providing a procedure for the critical examination (*Prüfung*) of the validity of

norms. As a matter of fact, (U) in itself can neither generate nor ground any norms. It rather points us to the possibility of the critical examination of norms taking us in the direction of requiring a justification. Correspondingly, the ideal speech situation can merely function as a critical standard. This readjustment of the status of (U) not only provides a new topological determination of communicative ethics, but also enables communicative ethics to exercise its mediating function between the thesis of the life-world as the normative fundament and the thesis of the autonomy of morality.

Communicative ethics occupies a unique position in contrast to other types of ethical theory by forming an essential aspect of modernization. The possibility of self-criticism is a constitutive condition for a rational society. Regarding the "moral" norms of our life-world, communicative ethics provides us with a rational apparatus or procedure for putting this self-criticism of society into reality. Indeed, the kind of self-criticism made possible by communicative ethics also prevents the life-world norms from degenerating into a heteronomous state. For the life-world norms could become morally heteronomous only when they appear in the form of coercive order and with unchallengeable authority — namely, only when they demand that people follow them blindly. Only when such a degeneration happens, then the life-world as the normative fundament is incompatible with the autonomous character of morality. However, if all the life-world norms are kept open to critical discussion, then they would not appear to be heteronomous or external. In fact, the possibility of the critical examination of their validity not only eliminates their infallible character, but also guarantees their rationally motivated acceptance by the people. To be sure, on the level of post-conventional communicative ethics, the autonomous character of morality is related primarily to the intersubjective consensus. Nevertheless, the process of rational self-criticism of a society can only proceed in a piecemeal manner. Namely, every criticism itself is of a horizontal nature. There is no rational self-criticism of a society that can be carried out "at one blow."

At the same time, as is shown above, since the "better argument" approach or the argumentative justification is just *one* form of moral grounding, it is a mistake to reduce moral rationality to communicative rationality — though the latter is a component of the former. Indeed, in a way comparable to the role played by perception in justifying natural knowledge, moral feeling in the Husserlian sense can also contribute to

moral justification. That is to say, there is also a non-discursive form of justification within the ethical dimension. For example, saving a child from falling into a well can be sufficiently justified by pure appeal to our moral feeling. Certainly, in the present industrial society, the human situation is highly complicated. Accordingly, in order to solve moral conflicts in a rational manner, the necessity of the communicative ethics is undeniable. But here communicative ethics has to be understood as a form of rational criticism. Moreover, one must admit that not all forms of justification are discursive. Finally, we can conclude that the communicative-ethical approach has to be supplemented by the phenomenological-ethical approach. In general, this should show that a philosophy of consciousness can cooperate well with a philosophy of language.

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Apel, K-O, "Kann der postkantische Standpunkt der Moralität noch einmal in substantielle Sittlichkeit 'aufgehoben' werden?" (Mx) 1985: pp. 21–22; p. 7; p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Habermas, J., *Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln*, Frankfurt, 1983: p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> Apel (1985): p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Gadamer, H-G., *Heideggers Wege*, Tübingen, 1983: p. 143.

<sup>6</sup> Apel (1985): p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Habermas (1983): pp. 91–92.

<sup>8</sup> Apel (1985): p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*: p. 16.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*: p. 17.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*: p. 21.

<sup>12</sup> Habermas (1983): p. 106.

<sup>13</sup> Kwant, R. C., *The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, Pittsburgh, 1963: pp. 159–160.

<sup>14</sup> Habermas (1983): p. 106.

<sup>15</sup> Waldenfels, B., *Phänomenologie in Frankreich*, Frankfurt, 1983: p. 164.

<sup>16</sup> Kwant (1963): pp. 159–160.

<sup>17</sup> Habermas (1983): pp. 107–108.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* Merleau-Ponty and Habermas are influenced by Piaget.

<sup>19</sup> Habermas, J., *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. by John McCarthy, Boston, 1979: p. 90. Instead of "generalizability," we here use "universalizability."

<sup>20</sup> Habermas (1983): p. 41.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*: p. 119.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*: p. 68.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*: p. 119.

<sup>23</sup> Habermas, J., *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. by John McCarthy, Boston, 1975: p. 159.

<sup>24</sup> Habermas (1983): p. 116.

<sup>25</sup> Tugendhat, E., *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, Berlin, 1967: pp. 201–211.

<sup>26</sup> Habermas (1975): p. 159.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Honneth, A., "Diskursethik und implizites Gerechtigkeitskonzept" (Ms.) 1985: pp. 10–11.

<sup>28</sup> Habermas, J., "Moral and Sittlichkeit. Treffen Hegels Einwände gegen Kant auch auf die Diskursethik zu?" (Ms.) 1985.

<sup>29</sup> Kern, I., *Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neokantianismus*, (Dissertation) Louvain, 1961: p. 386. Here we mainly base our understanding of Husserl's critique of Kantian ethical formalism on Kern's excellent reconstructive exposition.

<sup>30</sup> F 120 (1920): p. 258, quoted according to Kern (1961): p. 389.

<sup>31</sup> Kern (1961): p. 392.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*: p. 396.

<sup>33</sup> Apel (1985): p. 9.

<sup>34</sup> Habermas, J., "A Reply to my Critics," in *Habermas: Critical Debates*, ed. by J. B. Thompson and D. Held, London, 1982: p. 275.

<sup>35</sup> Taylor, C., "Sprache und Gesellschaft" (Ms.) 1985: p. 8ff.

## ART AND CREATIVITY IN THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE HEALTHY AND THE ILL PERSON — THE MORAL SENSE OF BEING ILL

Despite all efforts to the contrary, the basically negative view and judgment of the ill person in social life, of illness itself, and of the handicapped person follows from a prejudice of society in general that is still hardly overcome. Erving Goffman designates this apparently insurmountable feeling, which the ill or handicapped person evokes in the healthy person, as a "stigma." It seems that such a feeling expresses not only a lack of charity on the part of the strong for the weak, of the healthy for the ill, of those conscious of their strength for the frail and infirm and the elderly too, but this feeling also reveals that we, the so-called healthy, the vital specimens of the species *homo sapiens*, do not want to be disturbed in the process of self-realization which we have set for ourselves as our goal in life. From the vantage point of the "great health" of a Friedrich Nietzsche, the small, the weak, and the handicapped are doomed. The pathetic structure of man and his suffering or afflicted existence is hardly considered worthy of regard in the social conscience or on the social scale of esteem. The ill person, the person in a moral or existential crisis, the dying person, the person facing an incurable illness leading inexorably to death, the severely handicapped person or the person disfigured after an accident, yes, even the person condemned to poverty because of an unforeseen catastrophe or economic ruin is worth little when measured by the law of life and human destiny in the social conscience. And this holds true although such misfortune, which can befall anyone, often allows the afflicted a certain latitude or permits him to find a niche for himself through generous offers of assistance by his fellowman.

The meaning of human misfortune, to which illness and handicaps belong, is, however, in general not regarded, much less experienced and endured, as a common problem by the unaffected.

This gravitation towards a primitive narcissistic vitality, which reveals itself in the "naively healthy" person, seems to be an indispensable relic in a human society which declaredly lives by Darwinistic principles instead of asking what it means to be flung into this existence with all

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